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Constitutional Convergence and Customary
International Law
Responding to Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and Beth Simmons, Getting to
Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 53
Harv. Int’l L.J. 61 (2012).

Rebecca Crootof*
In Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice,
Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and Beth Simmons study the effects of post-World
War II human rights texts on domestic constitutions, with a particular focus on the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).1 After analyzing 680 constitutional systems compiled by the
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Comparative Constitutions Project to create a list of seventy-four constitutionally
3
protected rights, the authors evaluate whether countries incorporate internationally
codified human rights into their domestic constitutions, whether ratification of
international agreements affects the probability of rights incorporation, and whether
4
such incorporation increases the likelihood that countries enforce rights in practice.
After tabulating the data and running random-effects models, the authors find “a
significant upward shift in the similarity to the [Universal Declaration] among
5
constitutions written after 1948,” leading them to conclude that the Universal
Declaration acted as a “template” from which constitutional drafters could select
rights.6 They also demonstrate—after controlling for the era and a state’s prior
constitutional tradition—that post-1966 constitutions from states that ratified the
ICCPR are more likely to include its codified rights in subsequent constitutions than
non-ratifying states.7 Finally, relying on Freedom House’s civil liberties index, the
authors conclude that human rights agreement ratification and constitutional
incorporation is correlated with improved human rights practice on the ground.8
This ambitious project and its quantitative and qualitative findings are applicable to a
wide range of international law scholarship. Getting to Rights offers new evidence
relevant to convergence theory, provides empirical support for speculation on the
effects of international agreements on domestic law, and determines that human
rights are most effectively enforced when international and domestic law are applied
in tandem. It also suggests a methodology for similar future research into the
influence of supranational texts—such as the European, Inter-American, or African
Conventions on Human Rights—on domestic constitutions.

2

The Project “records the content of national constitutions as well as international
instruments[] for all constitutions of independent nation-states since 1789.” Id. at 69. The
authors considered a sample of 680 systems from the total 839 systems promulgated between
1789 and 2006, not including amendments. Id.
3
Id. at 72.
4
Id. at 64.
5
Id. at 77.
6
Id. at 81.
7
Id. at 87–88.
8
Id. at 63–64. This last conclusion is the most controversial. Unfortunately, however, and
perhaps due to the grand scope of the article, the authors do not provide a thorough
description of their methodology or an explicit consideration of all potential sources of bias
and distortion. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights
Treaties, 14 Eur. J. Int’l L. 171, 175–77 (2003) (noting potential distortions in the raw data
collected by organizations like Freedom House); see also Rebecca Crootof, Power in Numbers
(unpublished manuscript) (discussing common errors in empirical studies of the effects of
human rights treaties). The lack of a detailed explanation in this Part makes the authors’
conclusion less convincing than it otherwise might have been.

2013 / Constitutional Convergence and Customary International Law

197

From this garden of subjects, this response focuses on one offshoot: the
consequences of the authors’ data on rights convergence for customary international
law theory. After briefly reviewing the definitions of customary international law and
jus cogens, I discuss the potential implications of converging constitutionally protected
rights. I then examine the authors’ data in light of these hypotheses and conclude that,
from this point forward, scholars who argue that certain norms have obtained
customary international law or jus cogens status will have to address the Getting to Rights
data. Due to the necessary brevity of this response, however, I leave more complete
analyses of individual rights to others.
I.

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUS COGENS

Under the classic or “traditional”9 theory of customary international law, a norm
attains binding status if the general and consistent practice of states demonstrates that
the norm is accepted as law by the world community.10 State practice provides
evidence of custom, while opinio juris—the conviction that a norm is legally binding—
states the “attitudinal requirement.”11 The classical formation focuses on state action,
12
invoking opinio juris only to distinguish between obligatory and customary practices.
Alternatively, under what some term the “modern”13 or “new”14 customary
international law, some contemporary legal scholars argue for reversing the classical
requirements by downplaying or entirely ignoring state practice and focusing instead
on the existence of opinio juris.15
According to classicists, customary international law develops slowly through state
practice; advocates of modern customary international law argue that it can arise
almost instantaneously based on statements evidencing opinio juris.16 Under either
methodology, norms are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and there is little

9

Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A
Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 757 (2001).
10
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b) (defining international custom
“as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”); see also North Sea Continental Shelf
(FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), 1969 ICJ Rep. 3, 44 (Feb. 20).
11
J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 452
(2000).
12
Roberts, supra note 9, at 758.
13
John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 1175, 1199–1201 (2007).
14
Kelly, supra note 11, at 454–55; Roberts, supra note 9, at 757.
15
See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 546 (1993).
16
Roberts, supra note 9, at 759.

198

Harvard International Law Journal Online / Vol. 54

agreement as to what constitutes opinio juris, state practice, and—by extension—the
complete body of customary international law.17
Peremptory or jus cogens norms are distinct from other customary international law
18
norms in that they do not permit derogation, even in times of emergency. Broad
prohibitions against genocide, slavery, murder or disappearance, torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention,
and systemic racial discrimination are generally recognized as jus cogens norms.19 As
with other customary international law, however, there is no clear consensus on which
rights or prohibitions have obtained jus cogens status20—though that has not chilled
scholars from promoting their pet norms.21
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERGENCE FOR CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
As noted in Getting to Rights, “constitutional commitments carry unique weight in
terms of authority” for all countries.22 In democracies, constitutional provisions are
legally enforceable and will trump other domestic laws and policies.23 In autocracies,
constitutions are used to advertise fundamental policies.24 “For both democracies and
autocracies, then, constitutions are used as signals of policy goals, expressing

17

Kelly, supra note 11, at 450 (arguing that “there is neither a common understanding of
how customary international legal norms are formed, nor agreement on the content of those
norms”); Roberts, supra note 9, at 765–69 (outlining issues with identifying custom under
either the traditional or modern approach).
18
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 344, 8 I.L.M. 679 (“[A] peremptory norm of general international law is a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.”).
19
See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702 cmts. d–i, §
102 cmt. k. (1987).
20
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the International Court of Justice
may be tasked with determining when a specific norm is peremptory, but the standards it must
apply are not codified. See VCLT, supra note 18, art. 66(a).
21
For a humorous discussion of this habit, see Anthony D’Amato, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, It’s
Jus Cogens!, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1 (1990).
22
Getting to Rights, supra note 1, at 82.
23
Id. at 82–83.
24
Id. (using China as an example).
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fundamental values of the constitutional coalition” to both domestic and foreign
25
audiences.
At least in democracies, where constitutional provisions express requirements that
states are likely to believe they are obligated to uphold, they may serve as evidence of
opinio juris.26 The assumption that a constitutional provision represents opinio juris may
be undermined, however, where a state adopts a norm as a result of coercion, as
27
opposed to through persuasion or acculturation.
If the state actually enforces a constitutional provision, especially through legal
28
proceedings, the provision may also codify state practice. Looking to constitutions
for evidence of state practice requires a more nuanced analysis than simply examining
the text, however, as any given norm may not be uniformly applied.29 To the extent
that constitutions evolve from cultural identity and values, the understanding of what
is protected or prohibited by a certain provision as a matter of law will likely vary
from state to state. In one country, for example, the right to life may be understood to
prohibit abortions; in another, it will not be relevant to that discussion. Additionally
and alternatively, even if a specific right enshrined in a majority of constitutions
protects the same activity as a matter of law—say, the presumption of innocence in
criminal trials—that right may not be enforced in practice.

25

Id. (emphasis in original); see also Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signal, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83,
85–86 (2002).
26
Interestingly, stable authoritarian states are more likely to make customary international
law directly applicable in their constitutions than are stable democratic states. See Tom
Ginsburg, Svitlana Chernykh & Zachary Elkins, Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why
National Constitutions Incorporate International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 201, 233 fig. 3.
27
See generally Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004) (arguing that states change their
behavior with regard to human rights as a result of coercion, persuasion, or acculturation).
28
See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO
THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (2000) (noting that the
decisions of domestic courts should be considered state practice); see also M. O. Chibundu,
Making Customary International Law Through Municipal Adjudication: A Structural Inquiry, 39 VA. J.
INT’L L. 1069 (1999); Ingrid Wuerth, International Law in Domestic Courts and the Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State Case, 13 MELB. J. INT’L L. 819, 820 (2012) (observing that the ICJ
relied more heavily on national court cases as evidence of state practice than in previous
decisions). Using court decisions as confirmation of state practice is fundamentally different
from relying on court decisions attempting to identify state practice; the former are some of
many types of evidence, while the latter are assessments that are often undermined by the fact
that domestic courts tend to have a limited perspective and understanding of what constitutes
state practice. See Kelly, supra note 11, at 506; Roberts, supra note 9, at 775.
29
See, e.g., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 28, at 21 (“For State practice to create a
rule of customary law, it must be virtually uniform, both internally and collectively.”).
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At least in broad strokes, however, one might expect that, as “[t]he international law
of human rights and national constitutional law inspire and influence each other[, they
will] become increasingly similar.”30 In other words, to the extent that constitutional
provisions constitute evidence of opinio juris or state practice, one would anticipate
finding a rough correlation between converging constitutional rights and rights
generally accepted as customary international law or jus cogens. While by no means
conclusive, evidence of rights convergence—or the lack thereof—is relevant in
evaluating whether a particular right has obtained customary international law status,
though the domestic and international law may take turns at playing chicken and
31
egg.
In Getting to Rights, Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons have provided scholars with a
wealth of information on which rights appear in modern constitutions—information
with which proponents of certain norms having obtained customary international law
status will have to grapple.
III. EXAMINING GETTING TO RIGHTS’S DATA
Of the rights examined in Getting to Rights, some “appear to be so central that almost
nine of every ten contemporary constitutions include them.”32 These rights include
freedom of religion (appearing in 88.9% of constitutions promulgated between 1949–
2006, with an increase of 38.9% when compared with constitutions promulgated in
1789–1914); freedom of expression or speech (86.9%, +18.0%), freedom of assembly
(85.7%, +36.5%), and freedom of association (87.4%, +44.0%).33
Other rights protected in more than half of contemporary constitutions include the
right to freedom of opinion, thought, and conscience (76.3%, +15.6%); the right to
own property (75.1%, +25.9%); freedom of movement (74.9%, +20.8%); the right to
privacy (72.9%, +25.4%); protection from unjustified restraint (71.4%, +29.6%); the
prohibition of ex post facto punishment (70.9%, +14.3%); the right to form or join
trade unions (69.4%, +65.3%); the right to counsel (64.0%, +52.5%); the mention of
nulla poena sine lege—the legal principle that one cannot be punished for an action that
is not prohibited by law—or some equivalent (63.7%, +9.6%); the right to life (60.3%,

30

Louis Henkin, Sibley Lecture, March 1994: Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”, 25 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 40 (1995/1996).
31
Compare Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (1980) (citing provisions in foreign
constitutions as evidence of customary international law), with Vlad F. Perju, The Puzzling
Parameters of the Foreign Law Debate, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 167, 169–70 (noting that “[t]he very
fact of convergence [between international and foreign law] might be the effect of a norm of
international law on domestic legal systems”).
32
Getting to Rights, supra note 1, at 72.
33
Id. app.
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+36.5%); the presumption of innocence in trials (60.3%, +54.6%); the prohibition of
torture (58.0%, +29.3%); the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
(57.7%, +32.3%); the requirement of public trials (57.7%, +24.1%); some reference to
a state duty to protect or promote culture (52.6%, +49.3%); and freedom of the press
34
(53.4%, +9.1%). As is evident from these figures, in addition to appearing in a
majority of modern constitutions, certain of these rights have also recently increased
dramatically in popularity.
With the exception only of the right to counsel, each of the rights that appear in a
majority of modern constitutions is included in the Universal Declaration.35 It is
unclear if these rights have obtained binding customary international law status or if
they remain optional obligations which states may elect to assume. As noted above,
constitutional texts alone will not be sufficient evidence of opinio juris or state practice,
either because constitutional provisions are not binding law in some countries or are
not enforced equally. Nonetheless, certain rights’ majority status or evidence of their
relatively recent popularity may bolster arguments that they are well on their way to
becoming binding customary international law. This data may be of particular
relevance in responding to those who highlight sporadic but dramatic violations of
human rights as evidence of a lack of state practice.36
Although almost every right has increased in prevalence since its introduction, few are
close to universal: “The vast majority of rights . . . have penetrated fewer than half of
contemporary constitutions and appear to be optional constitutional features.”37 This
finding will need to be addressed directly by those scholars who argue that any of
these majority-minority rights—such as the right to health care (appearing in 38.3% of
contemporary constitutions), the right to a safe or healthy working environment
(26.6%); limitations on child employment (21.1%), or the provision of special rights
for juveniles in criminal proceedings (a mere 10.9%)38—constitute customary
international law.
Of particular interest are those rights that failed to gain traction. The Getting to Rights
data suggests that “rights, once introduced, generally spread across countries and

34

Id.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), arts. 3, 5, 9, 10–13, 17–20, 22, 23, 27 (Dec. 10, 1948). Elkins, Ginsburg, and
Simmons link the right to counsel’s success to its inclusion in the ICCPR. Id. at 73.
36
See Roberts, supra note 9, at 777 (arguing that the understanding of state practice should
be broadened to include, inter alia, patterns of obligations being observed as well as evidence of
obligations being breached).
37
Getting to Rights, supra note 1, at 72.
38
Id. app.
35
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maintain their [aggregate] popularity.” Nonetheless, certain rights declined in
popularity, sometimes significantly. From constitutions promulgated in 1789–1914 to
those promulgated in 1949–2006, the following rights experienced notable decreases
in popularity: the right to citizenship based on being born within a state’s jurisdiction
(jus soli citizenship) (-28.5%); the right of petition (-26.9%); the prohibition on the use
of corporal punishment (-24.9%); the prohibition on censorship (-23.5%); the
requirement of a jury or any form of citizen participation in criminal trials (-22.6%);
intellectual property rights (-18.4%); the prohibition of slavery, servitude, or forced
labor (-8.2%); the right to bear arms (-6.8%); the right to transfer property freely
(-3.5%); the right or possibility of pretrial release (-2.1%); the right of testacy, or the
right to leave property to one’s heirs (-0.8%); and the right of the accused to silence or
protection from self-incrimination (-0.5%).40
These negative or flat trajectories are not necessarily the result of certain rights being
written out of constitutions by subsequent drafters. A right’s declining popularity
might also be a side effect of a greater number of constitutions in later periods.
Alternatively, as modern constitutions are more likely to incorporate international
human rights by reference,41 their drafters may have felt that explicitly detailing
certain rights would be needlessly repetitive.42 Of course, another possibility is that
43
these rights simply lost their import, and therefore a greater percentage of drafters
in the later periods decided against including rights that other countries—and
sometimes a majority of countries44—had once considered constitutionally necessary.
Any scholar arguing that one of these rights has obtained customary international law
status will now need to provide a convincing argument explaining the right’s declining
popularity in domestic constitutions.
Finally, and oddly, it appears as though jus cogens rights are relatively underrepresented
in modern constitutions. The right to protection from unjustified restraint and the

39

Id. at 72.
Id. app.
41
Ginsburg et al., supra note 26, at 209 (noting that “the proportion of constitutions
incorporating customary international law in the domestic legal order doubled from the pre1914 to the post-1944 periods”).
42
For example, of 283 constitutions adopted in or after 1945, 69 mentioned and 24
specifically incorporated the Universal Declaration. Id. at 208 fig. 1.
43
Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons hypothesize that the decline in these rights’ popularity
may be attributable to their exclusion from the Universal Declaration. Getting to Rights, supra
note 1, at 81. However, they acknowledge that some of these rights were already declining in
popularity prior to the 1948. Id. at 81 n.67.
44
The majority of constitutions promulgated between 1789 and 1914 included the right to
petition (73.8%); the right to jus soli citizenship (59.0%); and the prohibition of slavery,
servitude, or forced labor (50.8%). Id. app. None of these rights appeared in the majority of
constitutions promulgated between 1949 and 2006. Id.
40
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right to a speedy trial (which relate to the prohibition of prolonged arbitrary
45
detention) appear in 71.4% and 24.3% of modern constitutions, respectively. The
right to life (which might be equated with the prohibition against murder) appears in
only 60.3% of contemporary constitutions; the prohibition of torture appears in only
58.0%; the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in only 57.7%; and
the prohibition of slavery, servitude, or forced labor in less than half—merely 42.6%
of post-1949 constitutions.46 The requirement that the names of those imprisoned be
recorded in a register (which relates to the prohibition on disappearance) appears in
only 2.0% of modern constitutions.47 Prohibitions of genocide and systemic racial
48
discrimination do not appear in the authors’ “comprehensive” list of rights at all.
Some might argue that modern constitutions’ silence on these theoretically
peremptory norms undermines their jus cogens status, as it demonstrates that they are
not universally accepted. Others might respond that these rights’ relative absence
highlights their strength, insofar as they are so broadly accepted that there is no need
to mention them in constitutional texts. A constitutional prohibition against genocide,
for example, seems somewhat superfluous. Meanwhile, many constitutions may not
explicitly forbid slavery or disappearances despite accepting the prohibitions as
peremptory norms, possibly because those states do not have a history of such
actions.49
*****
Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons are not the first to remark upon the absence of
human rights protections in domestic constitutions.50 Unlike previous scholars,
however, the Getting to Rights authors have made a concrete contribution to legal
academia by creating a comprehensive data set detailing which rights are included in
domestic constitutions and how each right’s popularity has changed over time.
Regardless of whether he or she adheres to the classical or modern theory, a future
scholar wishing to argue that a particular right has obtained customary international
law status will need to confront and discuss this hard data.

45

Getting to Rights, supra note 1, app.
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 72, app.; see also id. at 74 (“These seventy-two rights represent any right from the list
of seventy-four in
the Appendix that has been included in at least five percent of constitutions at any given
time since 1789.”). The Getting to Rights data highlight the intent of the original constitutional
drafters and does not take constitutional amendments that fail to completely overhaul a
constitutional system into account. Id. at 69.
49
See, e.g., Anthony A. D’Amato, Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea for
Change of Paradigms, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 47, 54 (1995/1996).
50
Id. at 53.
46

